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NOTES AND COMMENTS
FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE
INTRODUCTION

In tackling the subject matter of this paper we are initially confronted
with two apparent antinomies which seem incapable of satisfactory resolution.
First: "There is no constitutional right to exemption from military service because of conscientious objection or religious calling." I And second:
[N] either a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally
force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither
can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all
religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions
of God as against those religions
based on a belief in the existence
2
founded on different beliefs.
The current statute governing the basis for exemption by virtue of conscientious objection is as follows:
Nothing contained in this title . . . shall be construed to require any

person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
sociologany human relation, but does not include, essentially political,
3
ical, or philosophical views or a merely personal code.
1. Richter v. United States, 181 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
892 (1950) ; see also In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 572 (1945) ; United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605, 624 (1931); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905); Cannon v.
United States, 181 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950) ; Local Draft
Board No. 1 v. Connors, 124 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1941).
2. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). This is perhaps the culmination of
judicial thought beginning with Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871), where
the Court in a matter regarding a hierarchical dispute within a Protestant congregation
noted: "In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice
any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws
of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all.
The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment
of no sect." In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) a unanimous Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Roberts, reversed a conviction of a Jehovah Witness for violation of a
Connecticut statute requiring a religious cause to obtain a license upon approval of a local
agency as a condition precedent for solicitation of funds. The Court noted that "to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license,
the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is
a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by
the Constitution." Id. at 307. In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), the Court held a state statute requiring a compulsory flag salute violative of the
first amendment as it required "an affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind."
In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court stated that a state may not
exclude a person from receiving benefits of public welfare legislation "because of their faith
or lack of it." Finally in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) we find that government
may not prefer the believer over the non-believer or vice versa.
3. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 456(J) (Supp. 1963). (Emphasis added.) The limitation of
religious training and belief by a belief in a Supreme Being was adopted from the dissenting
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While the provisions relative to belief in a Supreme Being have withstood
constitutional attack in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, 4 the Second Circuit, reversing itself,5 has struck them down as violative
of the establishment clause of the first amendment and the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. 6
For the sake of convenience, we shall first look at the genesis of the present
statute. We will examine the World War I exemption statute-both its basis for
exempt classification and its success in the courts. Our focus will be on the extent
of the war powers of Congress as applicable to our situation. Turning from this,
we will study the World War II statute which predicated exemption on "religious
training and belief" and the problems which this change brought. While our
next logical step would be to discuss the implications of the 1948 amendment
which circumscribed religious training and belief by adding the Supreme Being
clause, we will postpone this consideration until we have seen the mechanics of
the process of induction and exemption, i.e., the administrative steps in the
Selective Service Act and judicial review. This perusal of the Selective Service
and judicial machinery coupled with the historical background of the present
statute will allow us to discuss the Supreme Being clause in light of past judicial
responses and present problems.
THE POWER TO CONSCRIPT-ITs ORIGIN AND ELABORATION

As the United States was drawn into the First World War, the need arose
for vast numbers of American troops. Congress responding to these needs passed
the Selective Service Act of 1917.7 By its terms it allowed the President to
conscript citizens and residents of the United States into the military unless
otherwise exempted. Exemptions were provided for "duly ordained ministers"
and "students who at the time of the approval of this Act are preparing for the
ministry in recognized theological and divinity schools."'8 Further, exemptions
were granted upon religious grounds in that:
[N]othing in this act contained shall be construed to require or compel
any person to serve in any of the forces herein provided for who is
found to be a member of any well-recognized religious sect, or orgaopinion of Mr. Justice Hughes in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931)
where he commented: "The essence of religion is relation to God involving duties superior
to those arising from any human relation." In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952),

Mr. Justice Douglas noted that "we are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being."
4. Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.

930 (1963); Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882
(1956) ; George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1952).
5. United States v. Bendik, 220 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955).
6. United States v. Seeger, 32 U.S.L. Week 2361 (2d Cir. January 20, 1964) ; see also
United States v. Jakobson, 32 U.S.L. Week 2257 (2d Cir. November 22, 1963).
7. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76. The effect of the statute was to grant
exemption to the historic peace churches, i.e., the Mennonites, Quakers, Brethren in Christ.
For a comprehensive analysis of these groups, their tenets and origins see Sibley, Conscription
of Conscience (1952) ; Selective Service System, Conscientious Objection (1950); Cornell,
Exemption fron the Draft: A Study in Civil Liberties, 56 Yale L.J. 258 (1946).

8. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 78.
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nization at present organized and existing and whose existing creed or
principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and
whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein in
accordance with the creed or principles of said religious organizations,
but no person so exempted shall be exempted from service in any
capacity that the President shall declare to be non-combatant .... 9
The main spring of the effective operation of conscription was relegated to
the Selective Service System, which was organized on three levels, consisting of
the National Director, the State Director, and the local boards. A board was
comprised of at least three local residents and was to be responsible both for
classification of individuals and for filling area quotas. 10 The board's powers of
classification were subject to review by District Board of Appeals which could
either affirm or modify the actions of the local boards. A decision was to be final
except as to be qualified by presidential executive orders. 1 The initial phase
of the process of conscription was the requirement that "all male persons between the ages of twenty-one and thirty, both inclusive, shall be subject to
,12
".. Failure to register was a misdemeanor punishable by up
registration ..
to one year in prison. The federal district court had exclusive jurisdiction over
3
this offense.1
This was the setting for the arrest of Albert Jones, who, in 1917, refused
to register for the draft. Jones, while awaiting trial for refusing to register, petitioned a federal district court in Georgia for a writ of habeas corpus. 14 The
main argument raised by petitioner was that the Act was unconstitutional as
demanding involuntary servitude which is proscribed by the thirteenth amendment. 15 The reaction of the trial judge was that:
The Grand Army of the Republic, the Confederate Veterans, and the
Sons of Veterans are not maintained to preserve the traditions of
slavery. Nations do not pension slaves to commemorate their valor.
They do not "give in charge their names to the sweet lyre"; nor does
''sculpture in her turn give bond in stone and ever during brass to
guard and immortalize the trust."'16
This opinion is important not for the rejection of the involuntary servitude
argument but rather as indicative of the attitude of the federal judges who were
authorized to mete out impartial justice at a time when war hysteria had
engulfed the nation. The Jones case reached the Supreme Court the following
year and the denial of the writ was upheld not only upon the authority of the
Selective Draft Law Cases,'7 but also, upon the fact that the habeas corpus writ
should not be granted before trial and conviction of the offense.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15
16.
17.

Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 79.
Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 80.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Story v. Perkins, 243 F. Rep. 997 (S.D. Ga. 1917).
U.S. Const. amend. XIII.
Story v. Perkins, 243 F. Rep. 997, 999 (S.D. Ga. 1917).
Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390 (1918).
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In the Selective Draft Law Cases, the Supreme Court rebuffed a frontal
attack upon the constitutionality of the Act.18 As to the contention that Congress
did not have constitutional power to inflict enforced conscription, the Court
replied: "It may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government
. . . includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service
in case of need and the right to compel it."'19
The Court refused to consider the question of involuntary servitude and
stated that, in effect, to say that serving in the defense and honor of one's nation
20
is involuntary servitude is to rebut the contention by the mere statement.
Another major argument offered was that the act of drafting members of
22
the state militia 2 ' was an unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty.
The Court, however, declared that if the State, by drafting its entire citizenry
into the militia, could effectively refuse to allow the federal government to draft
militiamen, the power of the latter would be a nullity.23 The Court also found
that exemptions for the ministry and theological students were neither the establishment of a religion nor an interference with the free exercise thereof. 24 The
final objection to be noted was that compulsory conscription is a violation of
the privileges and immunities clause as well as the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court stated that the fourteenth amendment has
broadened the national scope of the Government under the Constitution
by causing citizenship of the United States to be paramount and dominant instead of being subordinate and derivative, and therefore, operating as it does upon all the powers conferred by the Constitution,
25
leaves no possible support for the contentions made ....
This decision highlights the expansive sweep of the war powers and rejects
any attack on the bases of the establishment or free exercise clauses of the first
amendment, the privileges and immunities or due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment and involuntary servitude under the thirteenth amendment.
The war powers have historically been broadly construed by the courts.
It has been held that military law governs the active army and navy even in
peacetime, and the Articles for the Government of the Navy, which does not
provide for an indictment or grand jury for an infamous crime committed by
military personnel during peacetime, does not violate the fifth amendment. 20 The
18. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
19. Id. at 378.
20. Id. at 390.
21. See, e.g., N.Y. Mil. Law §§ 1-24.
22. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 371 (1918).
23. Id. at 372.
24. Id. at 390.
25. Id. at 389. This writer fails to find the basis for attacking the war power through
the fourteenth amendment since it is applicable to state action rather than federal action.
The opinion fails to state the grounds for attack under the fourteenth amendment and
assumes the fact that it may be applicable. The correct attack should probably have been via
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), where
the Court speaks of regulating the word "liberty" as used in the fifth amendment only in
accord with legitimate lawmaking functions of Congress.
26. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
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civil courts have no jurisdiction to enforce a civil remedy for false imprisonment
against a military officer attempting to prevent a sailor from deserting 2 7 Thus,
once a person is inducted as a member of the armed forces, the jurisdiction of
28
the civil courts vanishes.
Attempts to interfere with conscription by inflammatory speeches may be
punished if they create a clear and present danger since they would then be
outside the ambit of constitutionally protected free speech. 29 Private individuals
swearing out false information as to the liability of others for conscription may
also be punished.30 The willingness to bear arms, as contained in an oath for
naturalization, may properly be a condition precedent to naturalization. 31 To
32
induce, aid or abet another in defying the Selective Service Act is also a crime.
The government, therefore, has the right to the military service of all its able
bodied citizens, and may, when emergency arises, justly exact that service from
all.3 3 It can determine without question from any state authority how the armies
shall be raised, when by voluntary or involuntary methods, the minimum and
maximum ages of required service, the length of service together with the type
of activity to be engaged in and the remuneration thereof.3 4
As we view the Selective Service Act of 1917 as interpreted by the Court,
we see an emphatic affirmation of the Congressional powers to draft despite any
constitutional attack. The privilege of conscientious objector status was merely
a gesture of the sovereign's beneficence to be conditional upon the needs of the
nation rather than the needs of the individual. Religious objection to be recognized had to be via membership in a well organized sect. Finally, the power
over conscience was unleashed upon citizens of a locality where local intolerance
for a specific religious group, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses, often resulted in gross
injustice.3 5
The main change, for our purposes, in the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940,36 was to no longer demand membership in "a well recognized sect."
Rather, the new criterion was established-that of objection based on "religious
training and belief."
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person
27. Johnson v. Sayre. 158 U.S. 109 (1895).
28. Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878).
29.

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

30.
31.

O'Connell v. United States, 253 U.S. 142 (1920).
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Bland, 283 U.S.

636 (1931).

32. Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918).
33. In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). In Richter v. United States, 181 F.2d 591
(9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950) and Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F.2d
873 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930 (1963) it was held also that drafting during
peacetime is not a deprivation of "liberty" as that word appears in the fifth amendment.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931); United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605 (1931); Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871); United States ex rel.
Bergdofl v. Drum, 107 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1939).
35. See Heisler, The Law Versus the Conscientious Objector, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 441
(1953).

36. 54 Stat. 885 (1940).
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to be subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.
Any such person claiming such exemption from combatant training and
service because of such conscientious objections whose claim is sustained by the local board shall, if he is inducted into the land or naval
forces under this Act, be assigned to noncombatant service as defined
by the President, or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed
to participation in such noncombatant service, in lieu of such induction,
be assigned to work of national importance under civilian direction. 7
The 1940 Act raised several problems relative to an operational definition
of the phrase "by reason of religious training and belief." The crucial consideration was whether the terms required a belief in God or a Supreme Being.
This problem was far from academic for on March 10, 1941, Mathias Kauten
was classified by his local draft board as 1A. On April 3, 1941, he appealed from
the board's ruling stating, that his objection rested on the basis of "religious
training and belief," and, he was opposed to war in any form by virtue of such
belief. The appeal board found with the local board, apparently upon the grounds
that Kauten was an atheist. On June 19, 1942, an induction order was issued
which Kauten ignored. He petitioned a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus
which was denied. On appeal the denial of the writ was sustained on procedural
grounds, i.e., the defense of the illegality of the detention was not open upon a
writ of habeas corpus prior to induction. The inductee must submit to a
prescribed number of pre-induction steps exclusive of taking the oath of service 8
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, laid down this criterion for
exemption:
It is unnecessary to attempt a definition of religion; the content of the
term is found in the history of the human race and is incapable of
compression into a few words. Religious belief arises from a sense of
the inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the individual to his
fellow-men and to his universe-a sense common to men in the most
primitive and-in the most highly civilized societies. It accepts the aid
of logic but refuses to be limited by it. It is a belief finding expression
in a conscience which categorically requires the believer to disregard
elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom in preference to
transgressing its tenets. 89
The religious definition in Kauten was subsequently employed in the case
of Randolf Godfrey Phillips who was opposed to war, in toto, based on his belief
that "war is ethically and invariably wrong. '40 He stated that while he may
have initially developed his views in formal religious training, he had read widely
on the subject but could not specifically say where the source of his belief arose.
The Second Circuit reversed the denial of his habeas corpus writ by relying upon
37.
38.
39.
40.

Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889 (1940).
United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 706 (2d Cir. 1943).
Id. at 708.
United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521, 523 (2d Cir. 1943).
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the Kauten analysis of the religious impulse which by implication negates any
necessity for religious belief to be divinely oriented. 4 1 This view was held in the
42
Second Circuit throughout the Second World War.
The Ninth Circuit, however, decided that Herman Berman's refusal to be
inducted was not justified since he was properly classified as 1A despite his claim
to be conscientiously opposed to war in any form "by reason of religious training
and belief." Berman relied upon the Second Circuit decisions in Phillips and
Badt and the dictum in Kauten. He argued that "a person's philosophy of life
or his political viewpoint, to which his conscience directs him to adhere devotedly, or his devotion to human welfare, without the concept of deity, may be
religious in nature." 4 The Court of Appeals, however, rejected these contentious
and found that: "[N] o matter how pure and admirable his standard may be,
and no matter how devotedly he adheres to it, his philosophy and morals and
social policy without the concept of deity cannot be said to be religion in the
44
sense of that term as it is used in the statute."
Congress clarified its position in the Selective Service Act of 1948 as follows:
"Religious training and belief in this connection means the individual's belief
in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."145 By an act of Congress
in 1951, the title of the Selective Service Act of 1948 was changed to the Universal Military Training and Service Act, but the provisions regarding religious
belief remained intact.46
In summary then, the following: The ultimate question in determining
whether an applicant is entitled to conscientious objector status is whether those
beliefs are sincerely religious according to that term as defined by the Congress,
i.e., both belief in a Supreme Being, and also the objection to war must be in
toto.47 The local Selective Service boards may inquire into such sincerity and
good faith in determining classification. 48 The Selective Training and Service Act
of 1948 does not require any particular religious affiliation and even if such
affiliation be present, a registrant may be denied conscientious objector status. 49
Since, however, the Act retains the phrase "by reason of religious training and
belief" such affiliation is relevant in determining classification status. 50 Willingness to engage in a theological war will not preclude conscientious objector
41. Id. at 524.
42. United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944).
43. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, 378 (9th Cir. 1946).
44. Id. at 381.
45. Selective Service Act of 1948 § 6(j), 62 Stat. 613 (1948).
46. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 75-89, 50 U.S.C. App.
§§ 451-473 (1958).
47. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
48. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
49. Ibid.
50. Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955). Cf. Gonzales v. United States, 348
U.S. 407 (1955).
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classification; 51 nor, is the fact that conscientious objection is first claimed at a
classification hearing determinative-this fact only going to the question of the
good faith of the registrant. 5 2 Non-combatant participation in the war effort is
53
not inconsistent with objection to military service.
JUDICIAL REvIEW OF CLASSIFICATION

At the heart of the Selective Service System is the ability of Congress to
register and induct individuals. Registration is not properly part of the inductive
process and hence, does not find its source in the war power but rather in the
power of Congress to elicit information.54 After registration, certain information
is given by the registrant to the board. Upon this basis as well as the standards
embodied in the Act and the Selective Service Regulations, he is classified and
given notice thereof. The registrant may contest this classification by a personal
appearance before the draft board, and thence by appeal as enumerated in the
statute. Once these administrative procedures are exhausted he is ordered to
report for service. If he is found to be liable for combatant or non-combatant
military service he is ordered to report for induction. If, however, he is exempted
as a conscientious objector, he is ordered to report for alternative civilian duty.
The Selective Service process continues until he is accepted for induction or such
civilian work by the service or work camp to which he is assigned." Up to this
point of acceptance the question of the legality or illegality of the induction
order was not open for review under a writ of habeas corpus. The proper thing
to do was for the registrant to exhaust his administrative remedies, and then,
when ordered to report for induction, obey the order. After he arrived at the
induction center he had to submit to all pre-induction mental and physical tests
and do all that was required up to, but not including, the oath. At this instance
the writ of habeas corpus is available. After the oath is taken the jurisdiction
of the civil courts is superseded by that of the courts martial.50
In Falbo57 the majority, speaking through Mr. justice Black, held that
there can be no judicial review of the propriety of a board's action in a criminal
prosecution for a willful violation of an order directing a registrant to report
for the last step in the selective process. 58 The effect of this decision was to leave
as the only question, in a criminal prosecution for violation of any of the inter51. Sicurella v. United States, 348 US. 385 (1955).
52. Ibid.
53. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955).
54. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955). The guiding principle which limits
the Congressional power to elicit information is whether the information is related to a valid
legislative purpose, and only if this is the case, can Congress constitutionally require an individual to disclose his political or religious affairs. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959); NA.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).

55.
56.
57.
58.

Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 (1944).
Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
Id. at 554.
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mediate induction steps, whether the order was violated willfully. No other defense was available. The majority's view was premised upon a construction of
Act which, in view of the national emergency, held that Congress would not
have intended the Selective Service process to be vexed by time consuming
litigation."0 Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred, by saying in effect that the only
grounds for reversal would be the defendant's showing that he had been effectively denied his administrative remedies.60 Such not being evidenced by the
record he went with the majority. A strong dissent was registered by Mr. Justice
Murphy who felt that if in fact the order of the local board was invalid then
((common sense and justice dictate that a citizen accused of a crime should
have the fullest opportunity to present every reasonable defense. .

.

. Such a

denial is especially oppressive where a full hearing might disclose that the administrative action underlying the prosecution is the product of excess wartime
emotions."' 61 He rejected the argument that the process of induction would be
jeopardized by prolonged litigation since, if the classification was invalid, the
citizen would not serve; or, if valid, he would go to prison.
The inadequacies of the Falbo decision required the conscientious objector
to submit to pre-induction proceedings and thus placed him, although temporarily, under military authority. He was thus "required to violate his conscience
as a condition precedent to asserting his right under the act." 62 The physical
examination, being an integral phase of the military process, might be as morally
repugnant to the objector as the oath or military service itself. The jurisdiction
of the civil courts extended to the last point of the pre-induction process. It
therefore, was unnecessary as a matter of administrative convenience to require
reporting for induction to contest the ruling of the board since, first, the administrative process is deemed final when the order for induction is issued; 63 and
second, it is well settled that relief from further reliance upon administrative
machinery may be excused when any further steps would be useless or futile. 64
After the war, the Court re-evaluated Falbo in the Estep case and decided
that classification could properly be interposed as a defense where administrative
remedies had been exhausted but the defendant had not reported for induction.0 5
Mr. Justice Douglas speaking for the majority stated that where the local board
has acted "so contrary to its granted authority as to exceed its jurisdiction,"
judicial review will lie.66 The test of whether the board has acted contrary to
its jurisdiction is not whether there was substantial evidence on the whole record,
but only if there was no basis in fact for the board's determination. 67 Mr. Justice
59. Id. at 554.
60. Id. at 555.
61. Id. at 556-57.
62. Note, 32 Geo. L.J. 389 (1944).
63. 54 Stat. 893 (1940) ("ETihe decision of such local boards shall be final except where
an appeal is authorized in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President may
prescribe.").
64. Note, 32 Geo. L.J. 389 (1944).
65. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
66. Id. at 120.
67. Id. at 122.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Murphy, who dissented in Falbo, concurred for three different reasons. First,
he felt that any denial of due process by an administrative agency is entitled
to review by mandate of the Constitution; 8 second, that the vexatious litigation
argument in Falbo was nonsense; 69 and third, that judicial review by habeas
corpus, after complying with all the pre-induction processes required, is inadequate for those who by dictate of conscience refuse to comply.70 Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concurred in the result upon the grounds referred to in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Falbo, i.e., the question of the registrant's
administrative appeal being effectively frustrated.7 1 He, however, disagreed with
the majority's determination that the Court may look into whether the jurisdiction of the local board was properly exercised both on the ground of the
vexatious litigation theory of Falbo and a rejection of the jurisdictional fact
doctrine.72 The dissent held with Frankfurter's arguments relative to vexatious
litigation and the jurisdictional fact question, but disagreed on the question of
frustration of administrative review and lined up squarely with Falbo.3 While
in Falbo the Supreme Court indicated that a defense of invalidity of an induction
order was unavailable to a criminal defendant on trial for failing to obey the
order, Estep made clear that a very limited review of an induction order is
allowed.7 4 Experience since Estep shows that in these cases the courts will scan
the record for some affirmative evidence to sustain the board's findings or to
glean an inference that the registrant was not dealing with sufficient sincerity
or candor.75 Davis, not being entirely in agreement, concludes:
The Court seems to be striving, with little success, to reduce review to
something less than what is customary under the substantial-evidence
test, but the reality seems to be that judges in the application of the
standard find themselves unable to sustain findings having a basis in
the evidence which seems to them less than substantial.7
TnE ULTIMATE ISsUE-BELIEF IN A SUPREME BEING
As we have seen, the present statute predicates conscientious objector status
upon belief in a Supreme Being. The statute would by explicit mandate exclude
those groups which do not acknowledge theism and those which profess poly68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 128-29.
Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 135-43.
Id. at 145.
1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 8.16, at 596 (1958). In Jaffe, The Exhaustion

of Administrative Remedies, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 327, 352-53 (1963), Professor Jaffe notes that
where the failure to exhaust administrative remedies was not "a deliberate and intentional
rejection of administrative review," but rather an excusable failure (citing Donato v. United
States, 302 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1962)), or when the defendant "was amply justified . . .in
feeling that nothing further could be accomplished by exhaustion . . ." (citing Glover v.
United States, 286 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1961)) the necessity for exhausting administrative review
as laid down in Falbo was held inapplicable.
75. Dicdnson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 396 (1953).
76. 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 28.12, at 66 (1958).
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theism. Is such an exclusion permissible? Although the matter of exemption
from military service and the conditions attached thereto are a matter of Congressional grace, such a classification as above may give rise to deprivation of
the constitutional rights of those excluded.
If we were to consider "privilege" in the layman's sense, i.e., "a right,
immunity, benefit, or advantage granted by others and sometimes detrimental
to them,"77 we may well conclude that the government may annex any condition
it wishes upon that privilege.78 Since the individual has no right to the privileged
subject matter and may in the first analysis refrain from seeking the privilege,
he is merely returned to his original position if such conditons render the exercise or existence of the privilege impossible. 79 There are, however, boundaries
which limit either the conditioning or withdrawal of a privilege once granted by
the state. Whether the privilege be teaching school, 80 practising law,81 private
employment, 82 tax exemption, 83 higher education, 84 public office,8 5 or using a
municipal park, 80 there is a limit to which the state may condition or restrict.
When the aforementioned privileges have been unconstitutionally conditioned,
such restrictions have been struck down.
In juxtaposing the instant statute with the Constitution, we find that the
former may be in jeopardy. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court in discussing
the establishment clause stated that "it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship." 87 By inference
it would appear that if for purposes of eligibility for exemption only monotheocentric sects are considered, an acceptance of a particular creed or form of
77. 2 Webster, New Twentieth Century Dictionary 1432 (2d ed. 1956).
78. In George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 449, 450 (9th Cir. 1952) the Court of
Appeals in discussing the extent to which Congress may condition exemption from military
service stated: "[W]hatever the government may forbid altogether it may condition even
unreasonably. Outstanding in this domain are the cases dealing with intoxicating liquors.
Because the government may altogether prohibit production or sale, regulations of the most
arbitrary kind will be sustained." (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Eberle v.
Michigan, 232 U.S. 700 (1914); Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 13
F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Cal. 1935).) The court also felt that the analogy between the right of
conscription and the plenary power of Congress over foreign and interstate commerce allows
for the same "strict regulation" and "absolute restriction of the former in the same manner
and degree as the latter" (citing: Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) ; North American
Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 327 U.S. 686, 704-06 (1946); Carolene Products
Co. v. United States, 323 US. 18, 27-32 (1944) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113-16
(1941); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R.R., 299 U.S. 334, 346-48 (1937);
Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431, 439-40 (1936) ; Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 43637 (1925); United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 427 (1919); Caminetti v. United States, 242
US. 470, 491-92 (1917); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 US. 45, 57-58 (1911);
Buttfield v. Stranaban, 192 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1904).)
79. See French, UnconstitutionalConditions: An Analysis, 50 Geo. L.J. 234 (1956).
80. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
81. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
82. Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
83. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
84. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961).
85. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
86. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
87. 310 U.S. 269, 303 (1940). (Emphasis added.)
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worship arises.88 Conversely there may be a denial of due process under the
fifth amendment for those excluded. 89
If we compare the instant statute with a religious test for public office, eg.,
the signing of a declaration of belief in the existence of God constitutionally
required as a qualification for public office, additional problems arise. The instant
statute, in effect, makes a monotheistic religion the test for exemption. Both
public office and exemption from military service are privileges. The Supreme
Court has characterized the aforementioned test for public office as one of free
exercise of religion and that such a test unconstitutionally invades one's freedom
of belief and religion and is therefore unenforceable.90 The aside of Justice Black
is worth noting: "Among religions in this country which do not teach what
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others."91
We are now faced with a similar situation discussed earlier where the Second
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have taken opposite positions on the Supreme
Being question. As we noted earlier, the Supreme Being clause was added in
order to clarify the Congressional position on the definition of the phrase "by
reason of religious training and belief." Berman v. United States was in effect
made the law of the land. 92 Subsequent to the instant statute the Ninth Circuit
has followed Berman to the present.9 3 The Second Circuit followed Berman in
1955, 9 4 but in a recent decision, declared the Supreme Being clause to be violative of the establishment clause of the first amendment and an arbitrary classification, violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The Court
88. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
89. By a denial of due process under the fifth amendment, reference is to a violation
of substantive due process wherein the courts may find the exclusion of the non-theist to be
so arbitrary as to impinge the liberty guarantee of that amendment. Note that in In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 571 (1945) the Court observed that under the Federal Constitution "men
could not be excluded from the practice of law, or indeed from following any other calling,
simply because they belong to any of our religious groups, whether Protestant, Catholic,
Quaker or Jewish . ..."
90. Torcaso v. Watldns, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
91. Id. at 495 n.11. (Emphasis added.)
92. Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946).
93. In George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1952) the Court of Appeals
affirmed the content of religious training and belief as embracing the concept of a Supreme
Being but for some strange reason ended up by declaring the appellant to lack standing since
he admittedly professed such a belief. In Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956) the appellant completed an SSS Form 150, a special form
for conscientious objectors, wherein he answered the question, "Do you believe in a Supreme
Being?" by checking the box marked "No," and adding, "I do not know whether a Supreme
Being exists." Id. at 15. As against the argument that the Supreme Being clause offends the
first amendment, the Court considered the question as decided by the Berman and George
decisions. For the same result, see Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930 (1963).
94. In United States v. Bendik, 220 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955) the Court found that
appellant was in no position to attack the constitutionality of his classification since he had
not exhausted his administrative remedies but even if he had the sincerity of his conscientious scruples was immaterial, since admittedly they were not founded on belief in a Supreme
Being (citing Berman).
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of Appeals relied heavily upon Torcaso and also buttressed its argument on
Kautenf 5
The instant statute presents a retreat from the slowly emerging tendency
to recognize and protect conscientious objection. It rejects the reality of the
intrinsic diversity of the religious impulse. It substitutes instead, an a priori, artificial and limited legislative test of belief in a Supreme Being. In an effort to
obtain an objective standard, it'ignores the essential subjectivity of religious
sensitivity. Even the most outstanding writers on the subject of religion in a
pluralistic society recognize the fact that for religion to be religion, it need not
be theistic: "In this study I shall regard humanism as a religion along with the
three major faiths: Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism. This, I submit, is
not an unreasonable inclusion. Ethical Culture is exclusively humanist but is
generally considered a religion."9 6
CONCLUSION
The problem of conscientious objection has been subjected to Congressional
and judicial manipulation for nearly forty years. We are now in peace. The
climate is perhaps more appropriate for trying to place the needs of conscience
in perspective vis h vis the demand of national citizenship. Personal liberty
encompasses many things. The right of free speech, assembly, press, etc. All
these, however, must be placed in relation to the national good. Liberty of conscience is no exception. As the arm of the state may punish dictates of conscience
which are repugnant to the social order, e.g., polygamy, so also, must it be able
to reasonably condition permissible resistance to government by virtue of conscience. It must strive to insure national survival even if there are incidental
affronts to religious sensitivity. Discipline over mind and body is inescapable
in war. These words apply directly to a democratic society. Democratic peoples
are of necessity prone to be conscripted: "It is of the essence of a democratic
army to be very numerous in proportion to the people to which it belongs ....
[M] en living in democratic times seldom choose a military life. Democratic
nations are therefore soon led to give up the system of voluntary recruiting for
97
that of compulsory enlistment.1
The only qualification of the burden of conscription is that it be shared
by all.
When military service is compulsory, the burden is indiscriminately
95. In United States v. Seeger, 32 U.S.L. Week 2361 (2d Cir. January 20, 1964) the
Court was cautious to note that it was dealing only with the narrow question of the
constitutionality of the Supreme Being clause under the present circumstance and was not
passing upon the validity of legislative classifications in terms of religion in any other context. Seeger, by the way, was an admitted agnostic. Cf. United States v. Jakobson, 32 U.S.L.
Week 2257 (2d Cir. November 22, 1963), decided two months before Seeger, where the Court
discussed the jeopardy of the statute on both the religious training and belief provision as
well as the Supreme Being clause. The Court however never came to grips with either
question and dismissed in light of a procedural consideration.
96. Pfeffer, Creeds in Competition 5 (1958).
97. 2 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 271 (Reeve transl. 1904).
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and equally born by the whole community. This is another necessary
consequence of the social condition of these nations and their notions.
The government may do almost whatever it pleases, provided it appeals
to the whole community at once; it is the unequal distribution of the
weight, not the weight itself, that commonly occasions resistance. 8
Inasmuch as a democracy must close its ranks in time of danger and become one against the enemy, the plight of the objector becomes almost impossible. We have seen the attempts at categorization run an almost full circle from
rigidity to flexibility and back to rigidity. Our analysis started with "well
recognized sects" to "by reason of religious training and belief" and ended with
the "belief in a Supreme Being." The present law in this area is not satisfactory
due to its lack of understanding of the nature of religion and the possibility of
being seriously impaired by Supreme Court disapproval.
In the last analysis we find that neither Congress nor the courts have made
significant inroads in finding an acceptable solution. The expansion of appellate
review has been thwarted by a restrictive legislative act. Until a solution is found
liberty of conscience will continue to suffer and perhaps needlessly.
William A. Carnahan
98.

Id. at 271.

